State dossier
China
CHN · CHINA · board row present
What does this state want?
Coded AMBIG: Position ambiguous or evolving.
AMBIG since 2018-04-13, EXPLICIT
Position ambiguous or evolving.
At the April 2018 CCW GGE, China supported negotiating a ban on the use of fully autonomous lethal weapons systems (an oral statement recorded in secondary sources) while its written working paper defined those systems through five characteristics that apply cumulatively, including total absence of human intervention. The written paper itself calls only for precaution and contains no ban language. The two poles, at different dates, are recorded side by side.
China defines LAWS narrowly as fully autonomous systems.
LAWS should be understood as fully autonomous lethal weapon systems
Position Paper. Submitted by China (CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7), 2018-04-11 source
The paper sets out the five-characteristic definition.
LAWS should include but not be limited to the following 5 basic characteristics
Position Paper. Submitted by China (CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7), 2018-04-11 source
The autonomy characteristic requires total absence of human involvement.
autonomy, which means absence of human intervention and control during the entire process of executing a task
Position Paper. Submitted by China (CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7), 2018-04-11 source
The written paper calls for precaution and contains no ban proposal.
we call on all countries to exercise precaution, and to refrain, in particular, from any indiscriminate use against civilians
Position Paper. Submitted by China (CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7), 2018-04-11 source
A secondary report records China's oral call for a ban and its clarification that the ban would cover use only.
China called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons, but later clarified its call was limited to use only and not development and production
Stopping Killer Robots: Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Retaining Human Control, 2020-08-10 source
AMBIG since 2021-12-13, INFERRED
Position ambiguous or evolving.
China's 2021 position paper on military AI requires human control and the ability to suspend systems at any time, but proposes norms and national measures rather than a new instrument, and does not use the term LAWS. The paper neither advances nor retracts the 2018 ban-on-use language.
The paper requires human control and suspendability without proposing a new instrument.
Relevant weapon systems must be under human control and efforts must be made to ensure human suspension at any time [zh]
Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on Regulating Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 2021-12-13 source
AMBIG since 2022-08-09, EXPLICIT
Position ambiguous or evolving.
China's 2022 working paper supports prohibiting systems bearing all five of its stated characteristics - lethality; full autonomy with no intervention possible; impossibility of termination; indiscriminate effects; uncontrolled evolution - with the criteria applying cumulatively and modeled on the blinding lasers protocol, and regulation for other systems; it warns in the same document that general prohibitions would undermine legitimate defense capabilities. Both halves are explicit; together they support more than one coding.
China opposes broad prohibitions on autonomous weapons.
general prohibitions or restrictions may undermine the legitimate defense capabilities of countries, and even their rights to use relevant technologies peacefully
Working paper on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Submitted by the People's Republic of China (CCW/GGE.1/2022/WP.6), 2022-08-09 source
China supports a legal instrument prohibiting a narrow class of systems, following the blinding-lasers model.
could consider following the example of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons and work to reach a legal instrument to prohibit such weapons systems
Working paper on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Submitted by the People's Republic of China (CCW/GGE.1/2022/WP.6), 2022-08-09 source
The proposed prohibition applies only to systems bearing all five characteristics, which apply cumulatively.
Autonomous weapons systems with all of the five characteristics clearly have anti-human characteristics and significant humanitarian risks
Working paper on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Submitted by the People's Republic of China (CCW/GGE.1/2022/WP.6), 2022-08-09 source
AMBIG since 2024-05-23, EXPLICIT
Position ambiguous or evolving.
China's submission for the Secretary-General's report names the CCW as the appropriate forum, conditions any negotiation of a binding instrument on first agreeing definitions, rejects blanket bans, and restates the narrow prohibition proposal. China abstained on all three UNGA resolutions. The operative position sits between CCW-ONLY and a narrowly scoped binding-instrument stance, and the record does not settle it.
China names the CCW as the appropriate forum.
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons framework is the appropriate forum for the discussion of lethal autonomous weapons systems [zh]
Lethal autonomous weapons systems: report of the Secretary-General (A/79/88), 2024-05-23 source
China conditions negotiation of a binding instrument on first agreeing definitions and technical characteristics.
as a basis on which to formulate targeted measures and negotiate a legally binding international instrument [zh]
Lethal autonomous weapons systems: report of the Secretary-General (A/79/88), 2024-05-23 source
China rejects blanket bans in the same submission.
The introduction of blanket bans or restrictions would undermine States' legitimate defence capabilities and even their right to the peaceful use of these technologies [zh]
Lethal autonomous weapons systems: report of the Secretary-General (A/79/88), 2024-05-23 source
China restates the narrow prohibition proposal on the blinding-lasers model.
consideration should be given to concluding a legal instrument to prohibit them, following the example of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons [zh]
Lethal autonomous weapons systems: report of the Secretary-General (A/79/88), 2024-05-23 source
This state shown large among peers · hover a mark for its coding
How did it vote?
Votes: Abstain, Abstain, Abstain across the three resolutions.
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What has it signed?
Membership is fact, not opposition.
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When is it on the record?
The engagement cadence, dated.
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What has it written down at home?
National doctrine.
No published national policy identified by this project, as of 2026-08-31.
Reviewed for a published national policy specifically governing autonomy in weapon systems: the State Council Information Office defence white paper "China's National Defense in the New Era" (2019), publicly available Central Military Commission regulations, and PLA doctrinal publications and military strategic guidelines. The closest candidate is the 2019 white paper (official English text, State Council Information Office, https://english.www.gov.cn/atts/stream/files/5d3943eec6d0a15c923d2036), which characterises intelligentised warfare as a trend, stating that "intelligent warfare is on the horizon," but contains no provision governing autonomy in weapon systems: no human-judgment requirement, no review process, and no categories defined for national use. Characterising a trend is not governing it. Export controls under the Export Control Law, which require State Council and Central Military Commission approval for military and dual-use items, govern transfer rather than autonomy and fall outside this scope. China's position-layer documents at the CCW and the United Nations are diplomatic instruments, not national doctrine, and are recorded in the position layer. No published national policy governing autonomy in weapon systems was identified by this project as of this date.
The record
The documents on file.
Each mark opens its source